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(2006–2014) 
Executive Summary 
Acts of violence between or within political 
parties in Nigeria are usually associated with general 
elections and their spectacular death toll. This research 
uses statistical tools to analyse this violence during the 
2006–2014 period. Patterns of political violence between 
the 2007 and 2011 general elections differ strongly. 
During the 2007 election, killings occurred mainly within 
parties or were linked to the campaign. During the 2011 
elections, however, most casualties were reported after 
the announcement of the results. Nevertheless, it appears 
that killings related to general elections accounted for less 
than 50% of the total number of such fatalities as they 
were reported between 2006 and 2014. A large share of 
party violence is ignored, as it is mostly internal or with a 
low lethality rate. Arguably, violence is a means used by 
the political elite, rather than the people’s choice to 
protest against fraud. Levels of violence vary between 
parties and between states. As the ruling party, the PDP is 
a central actor, involved in 97% of the casualties of party 
clashes. Over the period under study, some events are 
particularly distinctive because of their large number of 
casualties and their links to ethnic, religious, or economic 
tensions.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
“To understand this kind of mafia-style activity in 
Nigerian politics, it is important to note that many 
political parties are operated by political ‘godfathers’, 
who use money and violence to control the political 
process.”1  
 
It was in these blunt words that the United States 
Institute for Peace depicted political practices on the eve 
of the 2007 general elections in Nigeria. As had already 
been the case with earlier elections, these elections led to 
hundreds of deaths. As we write these lines on the eve of 
the 2015 general elections, think tanks and international 
organizations have issued barometers and reports on 
violence in the shared hope of monitoring and deterring 
politically associated acts of violence in Nigeria. With an 
accuracy that we do not seek to evaluate in this article, 
they have made different predictions regarding the most 
violent regions and the causes of these recorded acts of 
violence. A complete review of these reports is yet to be 
undertaken and overreaches the objective of this research. 
Rather than seeking to analyse acts of violence associated 
with the next general election, this article will attempt to 
understand whether general elections per se are indeed 
periods of exceptional violence in Nigeria or merely 
reflect other tensions and processes occurring during non-
electoral periods. 
 
The question is central. Most press articles on 
Nigeria,
2
 a flourishing number of reports,
3
 and also 
                                                 
1
 United State Institutes of Peace, Nigeria’s 2007 elections, the Fitful 
Path to Democratic Citizenship, Special Report 182 January 2007 p. 
4.  
2
http://businessdayonline.com/2014/11/2015-political-risk-
outlook/#.VLjWZ8Yc50v and 
http://allafrica.com/stories/201411070362.html 
3
 See for instance pre-electoral reports by the Transition Monitoring 
Group, DFID, Cleen Foundation, International Crisis Group, United 
State Institute of Peace, UN… 
 IFRA-Nigeria epapers series, 2015, n°50 
4 
academic research primarily focus on elections.
4
 
5
 
6
 The 
only statistical analysis of party violence, proposed by 
Timothy Sisk, focuses on the 2007 and 2011 elections. 
Paradoxically, it argues that elections are not the most 
lethal periods in Nigeria.
7
 Drawing from IFRA’s Nigeria 
Watch database, which records fatalities as they are 
reported in the Nigerian media, this study rather starts 
with a debate on the definition of party violence, before 
detailing the forms and actors it involves. 
 
To do so it answers a set of central questions: 
What are the most violent periods of political party-
related killings? What parties are most associated with 
fatal violence, and which events are more lethal? To what 
extent can internal disputes and rivalries be seen as 
decisive factors in explaining deaths linked with political 
contests? What are the different scales of political 
violence, and how do they relate to each other? What are 
the states that are most affected by fatal contests between 
parties? How have these trends evolved between 2006 
and 2014? 
 
The following study shows that general elections 
contribute less than 50% of the fatalities linked to 
political contests reported during the period under review. 
Such violence is usually explained by the fraudulent 
practices that keep citizens excluded from power.
8
 In 
                                                 
4
 BASEDEAU, Matthias, ERDMANN, Gero, MEHLER, Andreas, 
Ed. Votes, Money and Violence: Political Parties and Elections in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2007 
5
 FADAKINTE, Mojibayo Mobolaji, Nigeria and Election Crises: 
Debating the Causes, International Journal of Humanities and Social 
Science, Vol. 4, No. 6; April 2014  
6
 IGWE, Dickson, (2012) The Perception of Electoral Violence and 
Democratization in Ibadan, Oyo State Southwest Nigeria, Democracy 
and Security, 8:1, 51-71 
7
 Ed. BEKOE, Dorina, Voting in fear: Electoral violence in Sub-
Saharan Africa, SISK, Timothy, “Evaluating Election-Related 
Violence: Nigeria and Sudan in Comparative Perspective,” 
Washington, DC, USIP Press, 2012, 300 pp. p.39. 
8
 QUANTIN, Patrick, “Pour une analyse comparative des élections 
africaines », Politique Africaine, 69, 1998, 13–26.  
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Nigeria, however, resorting to force is not so much a 
people’s response to election rigging but a tool for, 
among others, politicians. Thus a large share of political 
violence occurs within parties. Moreover, certain parties, 
such as the PDP, are systematically involved in violence, 
while others are not. Depending on the states where they 
operate, some party members seem to be more likely to 
commit violent crimes than others. Furthermore, they 
often seem to do so in order to trigger ethno-religious 
clashes which are more deadly. Since independence, all 
elections have been marked by rigging, when parties used 
violence to reinforce their power. The 2015 election 
seems to be no exception.
9
 
 
I. A HISTORY OF PARTY-RELATED VIOLENCE: 
‘GODFATHERISM’, ‘KADUNA MAFIA’ AND 
‘DEMOCRAZY’ 
 
Political violence in Nigeria is not a particular 
feature of civilian regimes. The first major political 
assassinations after independence came with the 1966 
coup and the execution of Prime Minister Balewa, along 
with Premiers Ahmadu Bello and Samuel Akintola and 
Finance Minister Festius Okotie Eboh. The military era 
then brought to power a group of politicians, officers, and 
businessmen that were nicknamed the ‘Kaduna Mafia’. 
Since the return to a civilian regime in 1999, the term 
‘godfatherism’refers to the criminalization of politics and 
the ability of some kingmakers to select and impose their 
supporters.
10
 
 
Historically, political violence had not affected 
Nigeria’s decolonization. However, rising tensions 
                                                 
9
 http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/174708-jos-
violence-call-supporters-order-presidency-tells-buhari.html 
10
 PEROUSE DE MONTCLOS, Marc-Antoine, Vers un nouveau 
régime politique en Afrique Subsaharienne? Des transitions 
démocratiques dans l’impasse. Les études de l’Ifri, 2010, p. 20-23. 
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between Obafemi Awolowo’s Action Group and the 
NNDP led to the end of the First Republic in 1966. The 
1964 general elections were marked by major 
irregularities.11 They initiated a system of rigging which 
characterized the following elections, with the “illegal 
printing of voters’ cards”, the “harassment of candidates”, 
“infant voting”, “box-switching”, and the “inflation of 
figures”.12 These malpractices provoked widespread 
violence in the 1964 general elections and the 1965 
regional elections in West. At the end of the 1980s, 
officials thus acknowledged that “rigging of elections has 
become part of [Nigeria’s] political culture.”13 
 
During the First Republic, the four major parties 
represented regional constituencies. Led by Ahmadu 
Bello and Tafawa Balewa, the Northern People’s 
Congress (NPC) was strong in the North, together with 
Aminu Kano’s Northern Elements Progressive Union 
(NEPU), while the mostly Yoruba Action Group had its 
roots in the West, and the National Council of Nigerian 
Citizens represented the Igbo in the East. Lying behind 
these regional identities were also religious determinants 
and the idea that there was an equilibrium to be found 
between a Christian South and a Muslim North. This 
representation of a divided federation is still very present 
today. 
 
During the Second Republic, the 1979 and 1983 
elections were also marred by massive fraud and violence, 
which eventually led General Mohammadu Buhari to take 
                                                 
11
 HILL, Jonathan, N., Nigeria Since Independence, Forever Fragile? 
Pallgrave MacMillan, New York, 2012, p. 51. 
12
 Jawan, Jayun A and Osinakachukwu, Nwokeke, The Electoral 
Process and Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria, Journal of Politics 
and Law, Vol. 4, No. 2; September 2011,. p. 131. 
13
 1986 judicial commission of inquiry into the operations of the 
Federal Electoral Commission (FEDECO) reported by a report of the 
NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION of Nigeria in 2011 
in a Premium Time article https://www.premiumtimesng.com/wp-
content/files/2014/02/Initial-Report-Final-Version.pdf 
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power and ban existing parties.
 14
 
15
 The short-lived 
transitional Third Republic did not perform any better, 
and parties were again dismantled by military rulers. With 
the return to a civilian regime in 1999, the first elections 
of the Fourth Republic were then marred by massive 
fraud.
16
 
17
 
18
 Drawing from their research in the Niger 
Delta, Ben Naanen and Kialee Nyiayaana argue that the 
PDP increased the tendency to use violence as 
competition intensified:  
 
In many states PDP victory in the 1999 polls was 
marginal. To maintain its hold on such states the 
party made every effort to eliminate the 
opposition. Events connected to the subsequent 
2003 elections were to provide an indication that 
the party was hardly in the mood to concede 
power in a free electoral contest. Within the 
ruling party itself the struggle became even more 
deadly as a result of the individual ambitions of 
political leaders and their supporters.
19
 
 
This tendency was also bolstered by a change in 
the sociology of political violence:  
 
                                                 
14
 Voir TOYIN, Falola, IHONVBERE, Julius, The Rise and Fall of 
Nigeria's Second Republic, 1979-1983. London: Zed Books, 1985  
15
Jawan, Jayun A and Osinakachukwu, Nwokeke, The Electoral 
Process and Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria, Journal of Politics 
and Law Vol. 4, No. 2; September 2011,. p132. 
16
 COLLIER, Paul, VICENTE, Pedro C., “Violence, bribery, and 
fraud: the political economy of elections in Sub-Saharan Africa”, 
Public Choice (2012) 153:117–147  
17
 UKANA, B. Ikpe, “Patrimonialism and Military Regimes in 
Nigeria”, African Journal of Political Science / Revue Africaine de 
Science Politique, Vol. 5, No. 1 (June 2000), pp. 146-162. 
18
 The Carter Center, National Democratic Institute, Observing the 
1998-99 Nigeria Elections, Final Report , Washington, 1999, p.25-
30. 
19
NAANEN, Ben, NYIAYAANA, Kialee, State Failure and Niger 
Delta Conflict, in ED OKOME, Mojúbàolú Olúfúnké, State Fragility, 
State Formation, and Human Security in Nigeria, Palgrave 
Macmillan, New York, p. 124 
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[U]nemployed and angry youths, who led the 
communal and ethnic-based conflicts while 
remaining the scourge of oil companies, now 
became willing recruits for ambitious politicians. 
The new private armies, locally referred to as 
political thugs or secret cult groups, were now 
generously funded, armed with expensive 
sophisticated weapons […]. Inter- and intraparty 
clashes laid waste whole communities. Political 
violence intensified with the approach of the 
2003 general elections. 
 
Human Rights Watch reported that these elections 
led to more than 100 deaths. The struggle was reinforced 
by the necessity for candidates to be endorsed by a 
registered party, which incensed the stakes of primaries 
and congresses.
20
 The 2007 elections were “not credible” 
either, according to the European Union observation 
mission. They led to more than 300 deaths, most of them 
before the voting took place.
21
 Finally, the 2011 elections 
                                                 
20
 OSHODI, Ademola, “Return to Civilian Rule in Nigeria: Problems 
of Electoral Culture and Transparency over the past three Nigerian 
Elections (1999 – 2007)”, The Round Table, Vol. 96, No. 392, 617 – 
630, October 2007, p.619 
21
 “The 2007 State and Federal elections fell far short of basic 
international and regional standards for democratic elections. They 
were marred by very poor organisation, lack of essential 
transparency, widespread procedural irregularities, substantial 
evidence of fraud, widespread voter disenfranchisement at different 
stages of the process, lack of equal conditions for political parties and 
candidates and numerous incidents of violence. As a result, the 
process cannot be considered to have been credible. Given the lack of 
transparency and evidence of fraud, particularly in the result collation 
process, there can be no confidence in the results of these elections. 
This is all the more regrettable since they were held in an improved 
atmosphere in which freedoms of expression and assembly were 
broadly respected during campaigning, the judiciary played a 
generally positive and independent role and the people showed 
remarkable commitment to democracy, eagerly engaging in the 
electoral process and waiting patiently to vote in often very difficult 
circumstances.” (EU Election Observation Mission, Nigeria 2007, 
Final Report: Presidential, National Assembly, Gubernatorial and 
State House of Assembly Elections, Executive Summary, p. 2. 
http://www.eods.eu/library/FR%20NIGERIA%202007_en.pdf). 
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provoked an upheaval after the announcement of the 
results, causing more than 1,000 causalities, according to 
some press reports.
22
 
 
II. METHODOLOGY 
 
This study relies on the Nigeria Watch Project, 
which records fatalities reported in ten Nigerian national 
newspapers since 2006.
23
 We extracted from the database 
all the events that opposed political groups with political 
groups. The period under review starts with the launching 
of the database on 1 June  2006 and ends on 30 November 
2014. The data related to 303 incidents had to be refined, 
excluding stories that did not mention political parties but 
community and ethnic organizations, or Boko Haram. The 
analysis is thus based on 275 relevant incidents that 
involved political parties. For each incident, the number 
of fatalities recorded in the database is an average of the 
numbers reported by different sources. 
 
To study the elections’ impact on political 
violence, we first had to determine the dates of general 
elections. The 2007 elections were held on 14 and 21 
April. The 2011 elections took place on 9 April for the 
parliament, while the president was elected on the 16 
April. As the primaries of most parties had started in 
December 2006 and 2010, we decided that the electoral 
period under review would start four months before the 
voting date, that is, on 1 December. To be more accurate, 
we also included some events that happened in November 
and that were related to primaries or to the general 
                                                 
22
 United States Institute of Peace, Breaking the Cycle of Electoral 
Violence in Nigeria, Special Report 263, December 2010 p. 2.  
23
 The newspapers are: The Daily Champion, The Guardian, PM 
News (moribund and replaced by Leadership since 1 June 2013), 
Punch, This Day, Vanguard, The Independent, New Nigerian (extinct 
and replaced by Nigerian Tribune since 1 June 2013), Daily Trust, 
The Nation. 
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elections. The end dates were chosen empirically when 
election-related violence stopped. This is the most 
appropriate method, as we will show that the patterns of 
violence differ strongly from one election to another. 
 
The parties were identified with the help of the 
press clippings that are archived for each incident. When 
the perpetrator or the victim could not be recognized, they 
were tagged as being “unidentified”. When it was not 
possible to determine whether violence was internal or 
targeting another party, the event was also classified as 
“unidentified”. 
 
III. LESS THAN 50% OF DEATHS OCCUR DURING 
GENERAL ELECTIONS 
 
Figure 1: Number of party-related fatal incidents per 
year (2006–2014)  
 
 
Statistically, years during which general elections 
have been held can indeed be considered as having been 
the most violent. The 2007 and 2011 years concentrate 
most of the fatal incidents during the period under review 
(fig. 1). This finding confirms that general elections are 
decisive moments of violence, with 24 incidents and 62 
fatalities in 2006; 113 and 295 in 2007; 20 and 625 in 
0 
30 
60 
90 
120 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
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2008; 3 and 5 in 2009; 18 and 42 in 2010; 66 and 749 in 
2011; 4 and 9 in 2012; 6 and 212 in 2013; and 20 and 30 
as at 1 November 2014 (fig. 2). 
 
Figure 2: Number of party-related fatalities per year 
(2006–2014)
 
 
Undoubtedly, the election factor accounts for 
political parties’ violence. But the figures can be 
misleading because the number of incidents does not 
exactly match the number of fatalities. Although high in 
2007 and 2011, the level of violence is also considerable 
in 2008 and 2013. Despite a lower number of incidents 
reported, for instance, the year 2008 witnessed more 
victims than in 2007, with 540 people killed because of 
clashes between the winning PDP and the ANPP during 
the Plateau State gubernatorial elections. As for the 2013 
casualties, the majority can be accounted for by factional 
clashes between CPC rival groups, which ignited ethnic 
tensions between Gwandara and Eggon communities in 
Nasarawa, resulting in 197 deaths during the three weeks 
of turmoil. 
 
The monthly breakdown of fatalities also points to 
four sets of party violence: the political campaign before 
0 
200 
400 
600 
800 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
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the general elections, between November 2006 and 
February 2007; a peak in December 2007 because of 
Local Government elections that led to the death of 104 
people in Kano; deadly state elections in Plateau in May 
2008; the general elections of April 2011 (fig. 3). 
 
Figure 3: Number of party-related fatalities per month 
(2006–2014) 
 
  
Thus, the scale and patterns of violence related to 
general elections are different, with 164 fatalities in 2007 
and 746 in 2011. To assess more precisely the election 
factor, it would be necessary to analyse the difference 
between the incidents that happened during the key 
periods of December 2006 to April 2007, December 2010 
to April 2011, and, presumably, October 2014 to April 
2015. 
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Figure 4: Party-related electoral violence: number of 
fatalities, Dec. – Aug. 2007 
 
 
Figure 5: Party-related electoral violence: number of 
fatalities, Dec. 2010 – Aug. 2011 
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The differences between the two elections lie not 
only in the scale of violence; in 2007, most political 
incidents were reported before the vote and involved 
factional and personal clashes during party congresses 
and primaries, in addition to conflicts opposing at least 
two parties (fig. 4). During that period, internal fighting 
within parties and violence perpetrated by supporters 
accounted respectively for 27 and 131 fatalities. States 
with the most deadly intra-party conflicts were Benue (5), 
Lagos (4), and Oyo (3), while the states where rivalries 
between parties were the most deadly were Nasarawa 
(36), Oyo (19), Lagos (18), Osun (11), and Benue (7). 
There were very few fatal incidents and casualties after 
the proclamation of the results, although President Musa 
Yar’adua acknowledged massive fraud and corruption. 
 
Figure 6: Intra- and extra-party violence: number of 
fatalities, 2007 and 2011 general elections  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On the contrary, most of the victims of the 2011 
elections were killed after the proclamation of results, 
which were then contested in the streets (fig. 5 and 6). 
Intra-party violence caused 26 deaths; clashes between 
parties, 76. States affected by intra-party violence were 
Edo (9), Delta (3), and Benue(3). The ones affected by 
clashes between parties were Bayelsa (21), Gombe (11), 
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Akwa Ibom (10), and Oyo (7). After the voting day on 9 
April 2011, 36 fatal incidents caused 659 deaths, most of 
them in Bauchi and Kaduna states, and to a lesser extent 
in Akwa Ibom. 
  
To sum up, the findings confirm that general 
elections are moments of exceptional violence. Yet they 
explain only 45% of the total number of fatalities 
reported: 8% in the 2007 and 37% in the 2011 general 
elections. 
 
IV. INTRA-PARTY VIOLENCE ACCOUNTS FOR 
27% OF THE INCIDENTS AND 18% OF PARTY-
RELATED FATALITIES 
 
Figure 7: Number of fatalities associated with each party 
(2006–2014) 
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Figure 8: Party violence fatalities per year (2006–2014) 
 
 
Most of the ‘political’ fatalities reported in 2006 
are linked with the 2007 general elections and are 
internal, as in 2010 when 31 persons were killed in 
factional clashes within a party, as against 12 in external 
violence. In 2013, the highest number of fatalities 
resulting from intra-party clashes was found within the 
CPC in Nassarawa. Overall, 27% of fatal incidents 
involving political parties between 2006 and 2014 were 
internal, but they accounted only for 18% of the total 
number of deaths (fig. 9). This is perhaps because they 
occur during shorter periods, mostly during primaries and 
party congresses. Such violence takes two forms, which 
are frequently linked: 1) political assassinations of 
aspirants who fight for the official endorsement of their 
party; 2) skirmishes and riots that oppose rival factions 
within a party. 
 
Groups identified as gangs or cult societies are 
involved in more than 62% of 48 cases of intra-party 
violence, resulting in 274 deaths. These incidents 
occurred in 15 states, especially in Rivers, Oyo, Ondo, 
Edo, Borno, and Nasarawa (which recorded 197 deaths). 
With 16% of 194 cases that resulted in 101 fatalities, cult 
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societies and gangs seem to be much less involved in 
clashes between parties. 
 
Figure 9: Political parties’ violence: number of incidents 
(left) and fatalities (right) (2006 and 2014) 
 
 
 
V. CENTRALITY OF THE PDP IN CLASHES 
BETWEEN PARTIES 
 
Which are the political parties most associated 
with violence? From 2006 to 2014, fatal incidents 
involved mainly the PDP (86%), followed by the ANPP 
(27%), the AC (13%) / ACN (8%), the CPC (10%), the 
APC (5%), and the LP (less than 5%). All major parties 
were affected, but smaller parties do not appear in the 
data (see fig. 10).
24
 The PDP was also involved in 87% of 
the total number of fatalities, followed by the CPC (24%), 
the ANPP (21%), the AC / ACN (5%), and the APC and 
LP (1% each). 
 
                                                 
24
 For a complete list of officially registered political parties, see the 
INEC website: http://www.nigeria.gov.ng/2012-10-29-11-05-
46/political-parties  
 IFRA-Nigeria epapers series, 2015, n°50 
18 
Figure 10: Percentage of fatal incidents per party (2006–
2014) 
 
Note: The total exceeds 100% because each incident may involve more than 
one party. 
 
CPC has the highest rate of internal violence, and 
39% of its fatalities resulted from a single incident in 
Nasarawa. As for the PDP, 25% of its internal clashes 
accounted for 9% of its fatalities, mainly in Rivers (28 
deaths), Akwa Ibom (23), and Benue (21). Other political 
parties record a much lower level of internal violence, 
which caused 4% of the fatalities associated with the APC 
and 1% each for the AC, the ACN, and the ANPP. 
 
By contrast, external violence between political 
parties focuses on the PDP, which was involved in 97% 
of the fatalities resulting from such clashes (fig. 11). This 
is probably because the party in power is present 
nationwide and controls the resources of the Federal 
Government.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
86,2 
13,1 8,4 
27,3 
5,1 10,9 4,7 
0,0 
22,5 
45,0 
67,5 
90,0 
112,5 
PDP AC ACN ANPP APC CPC LP 
%
 
CORENTIN COHEN – VIOLENCE BETWEEN AND WITHIN 
POLITICAL PARTIES IN NIGERIA: STATISTICS, 
STRUCTURES AND PATTERNS (2006-2014) 
 
19 
Figure 11: Percentage per party of fatalities resulting 
from clashes between parties (2006–2014) 
 
 
Although the PDP is associated with over 97% of 
the fatalities resulting from fighting between political 
parties, this does not mean that it is the only perpetrator or 
victim. The CPC and the ANPP appear as its most violent 
opponents. As shown in Figure 12, most of the fatalities 
resulting from such clashes occurred between the PDP 
and ANPP (46%), followed by the CPC (41%). During 
the period under review, ANPP was the main rival of the 
PDP, especially in Bauchi, Oyo, and Kano, which were 
affected by violent contestation of the results after local 
government elections. With a total of 540 fatalities during 
regional elections in November 2008, Plateau was the 
most violent state. 
 
Struggles between the PDP and the CPC occurred 
only during the 2011 general elections. They occurred in 
the North, especially in Bauchi and Kaduna (95% of a 
total of 655 fatalities), and, to a lesser extent, in Gombe, 
Nassarawa, Kano, Kebi, Niger, and Yobe. In Kaduna 
State alone, more than 478 people were killed in the two 
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LGAs of Kachia and Zangon-Kataf. The CPC was not 
involved in fatal incidents against another party, but it 
carried on fighting the PDP once merged into the APC. 
Such clashes killed 21 persons between January and 
October 2014, and they did not involve any other party. 
 
Clashes between AC/ACN and PDP occurred 
mostly in Akwa Ibom (6 deaths), Ekiti (8), Kogi (5), and 
Lagos (9), with few fatal incidents (6 of 30) involving 
gangs. During the period under review, AC/ACN also 
clashed with the LP and the ADC (3 and 1 incidents, 
respectively). 
 
Figure 12: PDP clashes with other parties, percentage of 
incidents (left) and of fatalities (right) (2006–2014) 
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VI. HOW AND WHERE DO SKIRMISHES 
TRANSFORM INTO MASS VIOLENCE? 
 
Figure 13: Average number of fatalities per political 
clash (2006–2014)  
 
 
Some clashes between parties are more deadly 
than others, especially when they involve the CPC, the 
ANPP, and the PDP (fig. 13). Such cases usually occur to 
ignite social, religious, and ethnic tensions. Also, only 14 
incidents account for 70% of the fatalities reported during 
the period under review. With, respectively, 540 and 330 
fatalities in Plateau in 2008 and Kano in 2011, for 
instance, clashes between the PDP and the ANPP resulted 
in the burning of churches and mosques. In Nasarawa in 
2007, the ethnic divide opposed the Alago (supporting the 
ANNP) and the Eggon (supporting the PDP). Nationwide, 
cases of electoral violence mixing political, ethnic, and 
religious issues usually occur after the announcement of 
results, as in 2011 between the PDP and the CPC in 
Plateau, Gombe, and Kaduna. 
 
In this regard, some states are more likely to 
experience electoral violence, with over 100 fatalities in 
Kaduna, Kano, Nasarawa, and Plateau, an average of 40 
in Adamawa, Bauchi Bayelsa, Benue, Kogi, Lagos, Oyo, 
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and Rivers, and none in Abia and Taraba, perhaps 
because such incidents were not reported (fig. 14). 
 
Figure 14: political parties related fatalities per state (2006–
2014)
 
 
 Finally, some LGAs deserve particular 
attention because they are frequently affected by clashes 
(see the map below). This is the case, for instance, of Ini 
in Akwa Ibom (25 fatalities reported in 3 incidents in 
2008 and 2012); Katsina Ala in Benue (5 in 3 incidents in 
2007 and 2010); Ughelli North and South in Delta (9 in 5 
incidents in 2006, 2008, and 2011); Kano Municipal in 
Kano State (17 in 4 incidents in 2007, 2008, 2011, and 
2014); Okene in Kogi (33 in 4 incidents in 2007, 2008, 
and 2009); Gokana and Khana in Rivers (with, 
respectively, 9 in 3 incidents in 2006 and 7 in 4 in 2006, 
2008, 2011, and 2014); Bauchi LGA in Bauchi State (13 
in 4 incidents in 2007 and 2011); Akoko-Edo in Edo (5 in 
4 incidents in 2007 and 2011); Lafia in Nasarawa (244 in 
6 incidents in 2007, 2008, 2011, 2013, and 2014); and all 
Ibadan LGAs (11 in 7 incidents in 2006, 2007, 2010, and 
2011). 
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Map 1: Intensity of party violence in Nigeria (2006–2014) 
 
CONCLUSION 
This paper has shown that despite the focus of the 
foreign media, general elections account for only half of 
the number of fatalities related to party violence in 
Nigeria. Moreover, clashes between parties are not always 
reported and should rather be studied through local 
disputes. Although rigging frequently leads to protest, 
there is no evidence that political violence is linked 
mainly to electoral fraud. If the contestation of the results 
of the 2011 general elections provoked hundreds of 
deaths, local government elections are also important 
because they can exacerbate ethnic, religious, and social 
tensions. 
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The PDP is the main actor in violence. It records 
the largest number of fatalities related to internal disputes, 
and it is involved in 97% of all reported party clashes 
during the period under review, especially with the ANPP 
and the CPC in Kaduna, Kano, Nasarawa, and Plateau 
states. 
 
 These findings pave the way for a 
sociological and political analysis based on empirical 
studies. Several questions could be investigated. 
Regarding intra-party violence, for instance, are 
congresses and primaries more violent at the local, 
gubernatorial, or national level? Also, which gangs or cult 
societies are most involved in political violence in each 
state? Regarding clashes between parties, do they occur 
when election results are tight, and to what extent does 
rigging lead to fatal incidents? Do parties resort to 
violence when they are in a situation of monopoly or 
when they are contested in an open competition? Why are 
some party clashes deadlier and how do they transform 
into mass violence in certain LGAs? Answering all these 
questions would certainly help understanding the 
dynamics of political violence in Nigeria. 
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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND PARTIES MENTIONED 
IN THIS ARTICLE 
 
AC:   Action Congress 
ACN:  Action Congress of Nigeria, 
formerly Action Congress, AC 
ADC:  African Democratic Congress 
(Anambra) 
AG:   Action Group 
ANPP:  All Nigeria Peoples Party 
APC:   All Progressives Congress 
APGA:  All Progressive Grand Alliance 
CPC:   Congress for Progressive Change 
DPP:   Democratic People’s Party 
INEC:  Independent National Electoral 
Commission 
LP:   Labor Party 
MASSOB:  Movement for the Actualization of 
the Sovereign State of Biafra 
MEND:  Movement for the Emancipation of 
the Niger Delta 
NEPU:  Northern Elements Progressive 
Union 
NNDP:  Nigerian National Democratic Party 
NPC:   Northern People’s Congress 
NURTW:  National Union of Road Transport 
Workers 
OPC:  Oodua Peoples’ Congress 
PDP:   People’s Democratic Party 
SRM:   Save River Movement
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UPGA:  United Progressive Grand Alliance 
                                                 
25
 SRM is not a political party per se or officially registered, but it is 
involved in violence as it supports and campaigns for the APC in the 
2015 elections in Rivers State. See for instance: 
http://allafrica.com/stories/201401201193.html 
